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HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, Beazer East, Inc. ("Beazer"), appeals an
order of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania dismissing Beazer's claims for indemnity
and contribution.

Beazer claimed appellee, The Mead Corporation

("Mead"), was bound by a promise to pay Beazer all or part of
Beazer's response costs on a Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601-9675 (West
1983 & Supp. 1994) ("CERCLA"), cleanup of a site Beazer's
predecessor had acquired from Mead's predecessor.

Instead, the

district court granted summary judgment to Mead on Mead's
counterclaim for indemnity from Beazer against Mead's response
costs.

In doing so, the district court adopted a United States

Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation ("Magistrate Judge's
Report").

The magistrate judge had concluded that Mead was a

responsible party for purposes of CERCLA but that the asset
purchase agreement ("Agreement") under which Beazer had acquired
the site of the contaminated facility, the Woodward Facility Coke
Plant (the "Woodward Facility" or "Coke Plant"), required Beazer
to indemnify Mead against CERCLA liability.

The magistrate judge

reasoned that a provision for indemnification in a contract that
predates CERCLA's enactment will govern the responsibility of the
contracting parties inter se for payment of CERCLA cleanup costs
if the indemnification or release provision is a general release
from all liability arising out of a particular transfer or
contains an unambiguous promise to indemnify against all
liabilities that environmental law, present or future, may impose
because of pollutants on the property transferred.

The

magistrate judge then concluded that the asset purchase agreement
between Mead's predecessor, the seller, and Beazer's predecessor,
the buyer of the contaminated site, unambiguously required Beazer
to indemnify Mead against any liability for injury to the
environment from substances on the property, including cleanup
under CERCLA, no matter who polluted the site.

The paragraph in

question, Paragraph 4(c) of the agreement, required the buyer and
its successors to assume and perform "[o]bligations of the Coke
Plant to comply from and after the Closing Date with all of the

terms and conditions of any . . .

solid waste disposal permit,

license or order, hereafter issued by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency . . . in accordance with
applications now pending and listed in Exhibit F hereto."
Appellant's Appendix ("App.") at 23.
On appeal Beazer argues that the district court erred
in concluding this indemnity provision was unambiguously broad
enough to impose on it a general duty to indemnify Mead against
all environmental liability under either state or federal common
law concerning the construction of such contracts of indemnity.
We agree with the magistrate judge and the district
court concerning the substance if not the source of the standard
that must be used in determining the effect of an indemnity
clause on a party's liability under laws subsequently enacted to
protect the environment.

We part ways with the magistrate judge

and the district court, however, in the application of this
standard to the provision at hand.

We agree with Beazer that

Paragraph 4(c) of this agreement does not plainly and
unambiguously require it to indemnify Mead for cleanup costs at
the Coke Plant, and therefore reverse the order of the district
court granting Mead summary judgment, vacate the order which
dismisses Beazer's claim for contribution and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

On remand the district

court will have to consider both parties' contribution claims,
and determine the proper apportionment of CERCLA liability.

I.

Factual & Procedural History

Mead's predecessor, the Woodward Corporation, operated
the Woodward Facility as a coke and coke-by products
manufacturing facility from 1905 until 1968.
Woodward Iron Company merged with Mead.

In 1968, the

Mead, in turn, operated

the Coke Plant until 1974, when it sold the facility and
surrounding land to Beazer's predecessor, Koppers Company, Inc.
("KCI").

KCI purchased the Coke Plant under the Agreement in

question.

Paragraph 4 of the Agreement provides that KCI, as

buyer, or its successors, will assume certain agreements and
liabilities. It reads:
As of the Closing Date, Buyer shall assume
and agree to perform:
a.
. . . all other commitments,
liabilities and obligations expressly assumed
by Buyer pursuant to this Purchase Agreement.
*

*

*

c.
Obligations of the Coke Plant to
comply from and after the Closing Date with
all of the terms and conditions of any NPDES
permit issued by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency or the then
permitting authority, any permit or order
issued by the Alabama Water Improvement
Commission and the Alabama Air Pollution
Control Commission of the State of Alabama or
any successor authority, any license, permit
or order issued by the Jefferson County
Department of Health, and of any other
wastewater or runoff water discharge permit,
license or order, air pollution permit,
license or order, solid waste disposal
permit, license or order, hereafter issued by
the United States Environmental Protection
Agency and/or by the State of Alabama and/or
any of its political subdivisions, all in
accordance with applications now pending and
listed on Exhibit F hereto.

App. at 22-23.

Exhibit F contains a "List of Environmental

Applications and Permits."

It is divided into two parts, one for

permits related to air and one for permits related to water.
Exhibit F lists no permits related to solid waste.

All the

listed permits refer to their date of issuance and the issuing
authority.
Paragraph 8(a) of the Agreement requires Mead, the
seller, to indemnify Beazer, the buyer, against certain other
liabilities.

It provides:
a.
Indemnity Against Unassumed
Liabilities. Mead hereby indemnifies Buyer
against and hereby agrees to hold Buyer
harmless from and to reimburse Buyer for any
and all liabilities, losses, damages, costs
of settlement and expenses . . . which may be
imposed upon or incurred by Buyer in
connection with any liabilities or
obligations of Mead other than those
expressly assumed by Buyer.

App. at 29.
Paragraph 8(b), on the other hand, requires Beazer, as
the buyer's successor, to indemnify Mead, as seller's successor,
against other liabilities, including whatever liabilities
paragraph 4(c) imposes on the buyer. It reads:
b.
Indemnity Against Assumed
Liabilities. Buyer hereby indemnifies Mead
against and hereby agrees to hold Mead
harmless from and to reimburse Mead for any
and all liabilities, losses, damages, costs
of settlement and expenses . . . which may be
imposed upon or incurred by Mead in
connection with any liabilities or
obligations of Mead and/or the Coke Plant
assumed by Buyer under this Purchase
Agreement.

App. at 30.
In 1977, KCI transferred the Coke Plant and surrounding
land to the Industrial Development Board of the City of
Fairfield, Alabama ("IDB").
back to KCI.

In turn, IDB leased the premises

KCI continued to operate the facility.

In 1988,

Beazer acquired KCI and transferred the lease to a newly created
corporation, Koppers Industries, Inc. ("KII").

At about this

same time IDB transferred its ownership interest in the Coke
Plant and the surrounding land back to KII.
In 1981, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") and the Alabama Department of Environmental
Management began to investigate the Coke Plant site for toxic
substances.

As a result, EPA asked Beazer to sign an

Administrative Order on Consent (the "Order") that would require
Beazer to do a site-wide environmental investigation and
eventually cleanup the site.
Order.

On June 21, 1991, Beazer signed the

Issued pursuant to the Solid Waste Disposal Act, it

identifies thirty-nine problem areas at the Coke Plant.

The

Order calls each of them a "solid waste management unit."

Beazer

agreed to test each of these units for the presence of toxic
wastes and then clean them up as necessary.
On March 6, 1991, Beazer filed this action.

The

complaint, following amendment and dismissal of several counts,
claimed contribution from Mead against any response costs Beazer
incurred under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9607(a), 9613(f), or

indemnification from Mead based on Paragraph 8(a) of the
Agreement.

Under the Agreement's indemnification provisions,

Beazer claimed that the expense of investigating the toxicity of
these areas and cleaning them up was ultimately Mead's
responsibility.

Beazer also alleged that many of the solid waste

management units it agreed to cleanup are parts of the site that
Mead had dedicated to waste management but Beazer had never
utilized while it was operating the facility.
Mead denied any obligation either to indemnify Beazer
against these costs or to contribute to the cost of testing,
investigating or cleaning up the site.

It also asserted a

counterclaim under Paragraph 4(c) of the Agreement demanding that
KCI and Beazer, as KCI's successor in interest, indemnify Mead,
hold it harmless and reimburse it for all response costs that
investigation and cleanup of toxic wastes deposited on or in the
Coke Plant or its environs may require.

In another counterclaim,

Mead asserted, in the alternative, a right to contribution from
Beazer for any CERCLA costs Mead might be required to pay.
Beazer filed a motion for a partial summary judgment
seeking a declaration that Mead was a responsible operator under
sections 107(a) and 113(f) of CERCLA, and that Paragraph 8(a) of
the Agreement required Mead to indemnify Beazer against liability
for all response costs.

Mead filed a cross-motion for summary

judgment asserting that Paragraph 4(c) of the Agreement relieved
it of any obligation to indemnify Beazer or contribute to any
cleanup costs Beazer might incur, and that Paragraphs 4(c)

and 8(b) combined to obligate Beazer to indemnify Mead against
any CERCLA response costs Mead might incur.
The magistrate judge to whom the district court had
referred these motions issued a report recommending that Mead be
held liable as a "responsible party" for any government paid
response costs, that Mead's cross-motion for summary judgment
against Beazer be granted and that Beazer's action be dismissed
in its entirety.

Beazer filed timely objections, but the

district court adopted the Magistrate's Report as its opinion,
granted Mead's cross-motion for summary judgment and dismissed
all of Beazer's claims.

Beazer filed this timely appeal.

II.

Jurisdiction & Standard of Review

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over
this case under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1332, 1367 (West 1993) and
42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(b) (West Supp. 1993).

We have appellate

jurisdiction over the district court's final order dismissing
Beazer's claims and granting Mead's counterclaim under 28
U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993).
We exercise plenary review over a district court's
grant of summary judgment.

Viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, we must determine whether
there remain any genuine issues of material fact and, if not,
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.

See Bank of Nova Scotia v. Equitable Fin. Management, Inc.,

882 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1989).

III.

Analysis

Section 9607(e)(1) of CERCLA provides:
No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar
agreement or conveyance shall be effective to
transfer from the owner or operator of any
vessel or facility or from any person who may
be liable for a release or threat of release
under this section, to any other person the
liability imposed under this section.
Nothing in this subsection shall bar any
agreement to insure, hold harmless, or
indemnify a party to such agreement for any
liability under this section.

42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(e)(1) (West 1983).
appears internally inconsistent.

On first reading, this

We have reconciled its two

sentences by construing them to mean "agreements to indemnify or

hold harmless are enforceable between the parties but not against
the government."

Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex

Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S 1029
(1989); see also United States v. Hardage, 985 F.2d 1427, 1433
(10th Cir. 1993) (Under section 9607(e)(1) "responsible parties
may not altogether transfer their CERCLA liability, [but] they
have the right to obtain indemnification for that liability.")
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

As the district

court recognized in Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co.--Conn., 801
F. Supp. 1309 (D.N.J. 1992):
Because § 9607(e)(1) renders ineffective any
attempt to completely "transfer" liability,
the most a party can do to limit its
liability under CERCLA is to obtain from
another an agreement "to insure, hold
harmless, or indemnify" it from any
liabilities established against it.

Id. at 1317 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(e)(1)).
Thus, Beazer could have lawfully agreed to indemnify
Mead for its CERCLA liability or, conversely, Mead could have
lawfully agreed to indemnify Beazer.
did so.

The issue is whether either

The Agreement the parties rely on was executed before

CERCLA was enacted.

Therefore, we must, at the outset, resolve

the preliminary issue of whether a contract of indemnity that
predates CERCLA can be construed to include indemnity against
CERCLA liability.

This is a question of first impression in this

Court.
Other courts that have analyzed pre-CERCLA indemnity
provisions have uniformly held that a pre-CERCLA agreement can

require one party to indemnify another against CERCLA liability.
See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 14
F.3d 321, 327 (7th Cir. 1994); Hatco Corp., 801 F. Supp. at 131718; Purolator Prods. Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 772 F. Supp.
124, 132 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Mobay Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 761
F. Supp. 345, 356-58 (D.N.J. 1991).
these courts persuasive.

We find the reasoning of

Accordingly, we hold that a pre-CERCLA

agreement can require an indemnitor to hold the indemnitee
harmless from CERCLA liability.
Nevertheless, not all pre-CERCLA promises to indemnify
cover CERCLA liability.

We must look to see whether an

indemnification provision is either specific enough to include
CERCLA liability or general enough to include any and all
environmental liability which would, naturally, include
subsequent CERCLA claims.

The first step in this inquiry is to

determine what law applies to the construction or interpretation
of contractual provisions that affect responsibilities Congress
has imposed on us in statutes enacted to enforce this nation's
strong commitment to a clean, safe and attractive environment.
We now turn to this issue, also one of first impression in this
Court.

A.
In deciding what law to apply to determine whether
Paragraphs 4(c) and 8(a) establish an obligation for Beazer to
indemnify Mead against CERCLA liability or Mead to indemnify
Beazer, the magistrate judge looked first to the law the parties

chose in Paragraph 13(k)(1) of the Agreement.
Alabama law will govern.1

It provides that

Seeing "no reason to frustrate the

obvious and expressed intent of the parties," the magistrate
judge said he would apply Alabama law to decide whether the
Agreement's indemnity provisions were clear enough to require
Beazer to hold Mead harmless against CERCLA liability at the
site.

Magistrate Judge's Report at 9.
Finding no Alabama law directly on point, the

magistrate judge took a cue from the holdings of the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey that preCERCLA agreements may cover CERCLA liability if such agreements
are "worded broadly enough to encompass any and all liabilities,
or if environmental liability is clearly referred to in the
agreement."

Id. at 9-10 (citing Hatco Corp., 801 F. Supp. at

1318; Purolator Prods. Corp., 772 F. Supp. at 132; Mobay Corp.,
761 F. Supp. at 356; Southland Corp. v. Ashland Oil Inc., 696
F. Supp. 994 (D.N.J. 1988)).

After concluding that Alabama law

on the meaning of contracts was not inconsistent with this
developing standard of federal common law, the magistrate judge
saw no impediment to interpreting the Agreement under Alabama
contract law.

Nevertheless, he pointed out that construction or

interpretation of a pre-CERCLA indemnity clause's effect on
CERCLA liability might "be an issue best determined by a uniform

1

. The paragraph states, "Each of the parties elects that this
Purchase Agreement shall be governed, construed and enforced in
accordance with the laws of the State of Alabama." App. at 4445.

federal rule . . . and that the federal case law establishing the
standard under CERCLA may override any inconsistent state law in
this respect."

Id. at 10 n.2.

The first question that we should ask is whether the
national interest in uniform application of federal statutory law
requires federal courts to develop a federal common law to
preclude willy-nilly use of various state law principles in
interpreting or construing indemnification provisions that affect
liabilities under CERCLA.

Cf. O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal

Deposit Insurance Corp., 114 S. Ct. 2048, 2052-55 (1994).
Generally, federal law governs the validity of an
agreement releasing a cause of action arising under federal law;
see Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359,
361 (1952), but the construction or interpretation of a private
contract is generally thought to be a question of state law.
Accordingly, most courts have recognized that imposition of
CERCLA liability on a successor corporation is a question of
federal law.

See, e.g., John S. Boyd, Co. v. Boston Gas. Co.,

992 F.2d 401, 406 (1st Cir. 1993); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music,
Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1457 (9th Cir. 1986); HRW Sys., Inc. v.
Washington Gas Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318 326-28 (D. Md. 1993);
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814
F. Supp. 1266, 1267-68 (E.D. Va. 1992).
Nevertheless, all of the courts of appeals that have
considered developing a federal rule of decision appear to have
decided it is better to look to state law in interpreting or

construing a contract's indemnification provisions vis-á-vis
CERCLA.2
In John S. Boyd Co., the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit looked to the Massachusetts law of
contracts to apportion CERCLA liability among contracting parties
inter se.

In construing the parties' written agreement, it said,

"state contract law . . . provide[s] the substantive rule, so
long as it is not hostile to the federal interests animating
CERCLA."

John S. Boyd Co., 992 F.2d at 406 (citations omitted);

Hardage, 985 F.2d at 1433 n.2 ("Because the government's
interests are unaffected by the allocation of liability between
jointly and severally liable parties, we easily conclude that a
uniform federal rule is unnecessary and that state law will
govern the indemnification clauses."); see also O'Melveny, 114
S. Ct. at 2055 ("Our cases uniformly require the existence of [a
2

. See John S. Boyd Co., 992 F.2d at 406 (incorporating state
law into federal law to construe an agreement pertaining to
CERCLA liability); Olin Corp. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 5
F.3d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1993) (state law supplies the principles
that govern the construction or interpretation of indemnification
clause applicable to CERCLA liability); Hardage, 985 F.2d at 1433
& n.2; Mardan Corp., 804 F.2d at 1458, 1460 (holding that federal
courts should look to applicable state law to decide the validity
of releases of claims under CERCLA); see also City of Phoenix,
Az. v. Garbage Servs. Co., 827 F. Supp. 600, 602-03 (D. Ariz.
1993) ("When developing federal common law, the court must decide
whether to fashion a nationally uniform federal rule, or
incorporate state law as the federal rule of decision. . . . The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has taken both approaches when
filling in the gaps left by CERCLA, depending on the context.")
(citations omitted); cf. HRW Sys. Inc., 823 F. Supp. at 328
(adopting federal "continuity of enterprise test endorsed by
Fourth Circuit rather than state law to determination of
corporate successor liability); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel., 814
F. Supp. at 1268 (same).

significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and
the use of state law] as a precondition for recognition of a
federal rule of decision.").
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has analyzed the issue of choosing state or federal
common law to determine whether private indemnification
agreements cover CERCLA liability in depth.
804 F.2d at 1458-60.

See Mardan Corp.,

In Mardan Corp., the government, in an

amicus brief, argued for state law to provide the substance of
the decision rule.

It said that "whether and when agreements

between private 'responsible parties' can settle disputes over
contribution rights under [CERCLA]" did not require the
development of a uniform federal rule.

Id. at 1458.

The court

of appeals stated:
[S]ection [9607(e)(1)] expressly preserves
agreements to insure, to hold harmless, or to
indemnify a party held liable under [CERCLA].
Absent CERCLA, these contracts would be
interpreted under state law. By preserving
such agreements, Congress seems to have
expressed an intent to preserve the
associated body of state law under which
agreements between private parties would
normally be interpreted. Certainly federal
courts need not fashion federal common law to
interpret every settlement of liability that
arises under federal statutes.

Id.
Because Congress's intent to require a federal rule of
decision was "not entirely clear," the court of appeals
considered whether the policies Congress sought to advance by

enacting CERCLA required a uniform federal standard for the
interpretation and construction of indemnity clauses.

For

guidance it looked to the Supreme Court's opinion in United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).

Id.

Kimbell

Foods set out the factors courts should use to determine when a
uniform federal rule is needed to decide federal claims based on
federal statutes when Congress has not made clear its intent on
what law should supply a rule of decision.

See Kimbell Foods,

440 U.S. at 728-29. They are:
(1) whether the issue requires "a nationally
uniform body of law"; (2) "whether
application of state law would frustrate
specific objectives of the federal programs";
and (3) whether "application of a federal
rule would disrupt commercial relationships
predicated on state law."

Mardan Corp., 804 F.2d at 1458 (citing Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at
728-29).

The court of appeals in Mardan Corp. applied Kimbell

Foods and concluded there was no need for a federal common law
standard.

It stated:
First, we find no reason to think that
the issue requires a uniform body of law.
Commercial enterprises selling their assets
or insuring themselves will normally look to
state law to interpret their indemnification
provisions, which will generally indemnify
the enterprises against a whole host of
possible liabilities. Disuniformity does not
seem to impose any particular burden. . . .
Second, the application of state law to
interpret such releases will not frustrate
the objectives of CERCLA. Contractual
arrangements apportioning CERCLA liabilities
between private "responsible parties" are
essentially tangential to the enforcement of
CERCLA's liability provisions. Such

agreements cannot alter or excuse the
underlying liability, but can only change who
ultimately pays that liability. . . .
*

*

*

Finally, we are convinced that
application of a federal rule . . . would
disrupt commercial relationships predicated
on state law. . . . Creating a federal rule
to govern CERCLA releases would introduce
confusion and uncertainty into these
commercial relationships in two respects.
One, buyers and sellers would face greater
confusion about which body of law to turn to.
Two, the creation of a federal rule, as
opposed to incorporating a ready-made and
fully fleshed out body of state law, would,
during the development of that federal rule,
leave parties very uncertain about what rule
governed CERCLA releases. . . .

Id. at 1458-60.
Judge Reinhardt, in a dissent in Mardan Corp., thought
that a uniform federal rule should be applied to determine
whether any particular agreement indemnified against CERCLA
liability.

Mardan Corp., 804 F.2d at 1463 (Reinhardt, J.

dissenting).

Citing cases that adopted uniform federal rules to

determine liability under section 9607 and the legislative
history of that section stressing the need for "'a uniform rule
of law . . . to discourage business[es] dealing in hazardous
substances from locating primarily in states with more lenient
laws,'" Judge Reinhardt reasoned that "a uniform federal rule
regarding releases from CERCLA liability serves Congress' goals
in the same manner that a uniform rule regarding liability does."
Id. at 1464 (citing 5 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20, 6132 (1980) and

quoting 126 Cong. Rec. H11787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement
of Representative Florio, CERCLA House sponsor) (alteration in
original)).

But see id. at 1459-60 (majority opinion) (arguing

that parties are still fully liable to the government regardless
of applicable law and concluding that adoption of state law does
not conflict with congressional purpose underlying CERCLA).
Though this Court has yet to consider what law should
govern the construction or interpretation of any particular
indemnity provision on the apportionment of CERCLA liability
among contracting parties, we have adopted a federal common law
standard in other environmental contexts.3

In Smith Land &

Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., we stressed the need for
uniform standards if CERCLA is to be effective and indicated that
a district court considering successor liability under CERCLA
should look to "[t]he general doctrine of successor liability in
operation in most states . . . rather than the excessively narrow
statutes which might apply in only a few states."
Improvement Corp., 851 F.2d at 92.

Smith Land &

We reasoned if we refused to

apply uniform federal standards to regulate CERCLA liability,
"CERCLA aims may be evaded easily by a responsible party's choice
to arrange a merger or consolidation under the laws of particular
states which unduly restrict successor liability."

Id.

In

Lansford-Coaldale Water Authority v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209
3

. It is perhaps material to note that these standards do not
spring full formed and grown from the heads of federal judges as
Athena did from Zeus nor does any Delphic oracle whisper
uniformly in each judge's ear. See Manfred Lurker, Dictionary of
Gods & Goddesses, Devils & Demons 44-45 (1987)

(3d Cir. 1993), we also expressed a preference for uniform
federal standards to govern CERCLA liability.

We held that

"given the federal interest in uniformity in the application of
CERCLA, it is federal common law, and not state law, which
governs when corporate veil-piercing is justified under CERCLA."
Id. at 1225 (citations omitted).
None of our cases, however, deal with the need for a
federal standard in interpreting or construing contracts to
indemnify and our sister courts of appeals have uniformly
selected state law.

See supra note 2.

Fortunately we see no

need to create a circuit conflict and will join the other courts
of appeals that look to the law of a particular state concerning
the construction or interpretation of contracts of indemnity to
determine whether a particular indemnification provision covers
CERCLA liability.

We thus endorse the majority's reasoning and

application of the Kimbell Foods test in Mardan Corp.
Moreover, we see support for this principle in the
Supreme Court's recent decision in O'Melveny & Myers.

It teaches

us that special federal rules are justified only in "situations
where there is a 'significant conflict between some federal
policy or interest and the use of state law.'"

O'Melveny &

Myers, 114 S. Ct. at 2055 (quoting Wallis v. Pan American
Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
In O'Melveny & Myers, the Supreme Court considered
whether federal or state decisional law should govern the
question of imputation of knowledge in a suit where the FDIC sued
in its capacity as receiver for a federally insured bank that had

failed.

The FDIC argued that Kimbell Foods required the district

court to apply a uniform federal rule of decision to determine
FDIC's rights because "federal law governs questions involving
the rights of the United States under nationwide federal
programs."

O'Melveny & Myers, 114 S. Ct. at 2053 (quoting

Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 726).

The Supreme Court first stated,

"[T]he FDIC is not the United States, and even if it were we
would be begging the question to assume that it was asserting its
own rights rather than, as receiver, the rights of [the failed
bank.]"

Id. (emphasis added).

It went on to note, "The rules of

decision at issue here do not govern the primary conduct of the
United States or any of its agents or contractors, but affect
only the FDIC's rights and liabilities, as receiver, with respect
to primary conduct on the part of private actors that has already
occurred."

Id. at 3055 (emphasis added).

The Supreme Court then

held that the issue of imputed knowledge in bank receivership
cases "is not one of those extraordinary cases in which the
judicial creation of a federal rule of decision is warranted."
Id. at 2056.
How Beazer and Mead apportion their CERCLA liability
among themselves does not affect the primary duty they owe the
United States to clean up the poisons left to befoul the site
both used.

Whether one must indemnify the other concerns instead

the liability of private actors for acts already done, just as
the liability of the alleged tortfeasor in O'Melveny involved the
FDIC's right, as successor to the private right of an injured
party, to recover for the injuries its predecessor had suffered

as a result of past acts.

How much Beazer or Mead pay each other

seems to us to have even less effect on the United States than
did the ability of FDIC to recover for tort injuries suffered by
the failed bank it took over.

The interpretation and

construction of Paragraph 4(c) has no impact on either party's
liability to the government.
851 F.2d at 89.

See Smith Land & Improvement Corp.,

On reason as well as authority, we therefore

hold that state law should determine whether any particular
contract of indemnity provision can be construed generally or
broadly enough to cover one responsible party's liability to
another.

B.
Having determined that state law on the interpretation
and construction of indemnification agreements applies to this
case, we turn to the question of what state law should be
applied.

On that issue, we can quickly agree with the district

court and apply Alabama law.4
4

. We again note the magistrate judge, despite his summary
conclusion that Alabama law controls, seems to have applied the
standard adopted by the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey. That court has used a federal standard
to conclude that an indemnification or release provision which
affects a party's CERCLA liability must be:
(1) a broad waiver of "all liabilities of any
type whatsoever" . . . which would clearly
evince the parties' broad intent to finally
settle all present and future liability
issues arising from the sale,; or (2) at a
minimum, "must at least mention that one
party is assuming [all] environmental-type
liabilities" . . . which would clearly evince

We look to decisions of the Alabama courts and
especially those of the Supreme Court of Alabama.

Its most

recent decision concerning the interpretation or construction of
indemnification provisions is Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Hall, Nos. 1921128 & 1921272, 1994 WL 107547 (Ala. April 1,
1994).

There, it held that indemnification agreements are

enforceable in Alabama if "'the parties knowingly, evenhandedly,
and for valid consideration, intelligently enter into an
agreement whereby one party agrees to indemnify against the
indemnitee's own wrongs, [and if that agreement is] expressed in
clear and unequivocal language."

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 1994

WL 107547 at *3 (quoting Industrial Tile, Inc. v. Stewart, 388
So.2d 171, 175-76 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1081 (1981)
(alteration in original)).

In Nationwide, Alabama's supreme

court recognized that indemnity agreements covered only those
incidents within their plain meaning and the court expressed a
strong preference for this limitation.

Id. (quoting Craig

Constr. Co. v. Hendrix, 568 So.2d 752, 757 (Ala. 1990);
Industrial Tile, Inc., 388 So.2d at 176).

The supreme court then

stated that "an indemnity contract purporting to indemnify for
the consequences of the indemnitee's own negligence is
(..continued)
the parties' intent to settle all issues
related to present and future environmental
liabilities.
Hatco Corp., 801 F. Supp. at 1317-18 (quoting and citing Mobay
Corp., 761 F. Supp. at 358 & n.15) (emphasis in original). The
magistrate judge states, however, that he used this standard
because it is consistent with Alabama law.

unambiguous, and therefore, enforceable when its language
specifically refers to the negligence of the indemnitee. . . .
[but that] such 'talismanic' or thaumaturgic language is not
necessary if the requisite intent is otherwise clear."

Id.

(citations omitted).5
We conclude that Alabama law requires a plain and
unambiguous expression of intent to cover the cost of the
liability in question.

Using this standard, we now consider

whether Paragraph 4(c) unambiguously expresses Beazer's intent to
indemnify Mead against CERCLA liability.

C.
The crux of the parties' argument concerns the district
court's conclusion that Beazer expressly and unambiguously agreed
to indemnify Mead for its CERCLA liability.6

They disagree as to

whether the magistrate judge correctly applied Alabama's limiting
standard to the Agreement. Paragraph 4(c) reads:
4. Assumption of Agreements and Liabilities
As of the Closing Date, Buyer [Beazer] shall
assume and agree to perform:
*
c.

*

*

Obligations of the Coke Plant to comply
from and after the Closing Date with all

5

. We do not think Alabama would apply a different rule in
deciding whether an indemnity clause covers strict liability
under environmental law.
6

. Whether an agreement is unambiguous is a question of law.
McDonald v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Corp., 585 So. 2d 853, 855
(Ala. 1991).

of the terms and conditions of . . . any
solid waste disposal permit, license or
order, hereafter issued by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency
. . . all in accordance with
applications now pending and listed on
Exhibit F hereto.

App. at 23.7

Exhibit F is divided into two parts.

Beazer argues

that Paragraph 4(c) limits its agreement to assume Mead's
environmental liabilities to the permits mentioned in Exhibit F's
"List of Environmental Applications and Permits."

Because

neither part of Exhibit F mentions any solid waste permit, Beazer
contends that Paragraph 4(c)'s promise to indemnify does not
unambiguously cover CERCLA response costs incurred in removing
any toxic wastes found in or around the Coke Plant.
After concluding that Paragraph 4(c) did not
unambiguously rule out a promise to indemnify Mead against CERCLA

7

. Beazer's duty to indemnify is controlled by Paragraph 8(b) of
the Agreement which provides:
Buyer [Beazer] hereby indemnifies Mead
against and hereby agrees to hold Mead
harmless from and to reimburse Mead for any
and all liabilities, losses, damages, costs
of settlement and expenses . . . which may be
imposed upon or incurred by Mead in
connection with any liabilities or
obligations of Mead and/or the Coke Plant
assumed by Buyer under this Purchase
Agreement.
App. at 30. The obligations imposed by Paragraph 4 constitute
"liabilities or obligations . . . assumed by Buyer [Beazer] under
this Purchase Agreement." Id. Thus, if Paragraph 4 encompasses
CERCLA liability, Beazer would be required to indemnify Mead
under Paragraph 8(b) of the Agreement.

liability, the magistrate judge went on to consider whether it
unambiguously required Beazer to indemnify Mead for CERCLA
liability under the federal standard announced in Mobay Corp.

He

acknowledged that Paragraph 4(c) was not a broad, general promise
to indemnify Mead against all liability.

Nevertheless, he

concluded that the text of the paragraph
clearly implies that, as between Beazer and
Mead, Beazer would be responsible for any
environmental liability arising from the
Woodward Facility after the date of the sale.
Even more than this implication regarding all
environmental liability, the provision
expressly provides that Beazer will be
responsible for complying with orders issued
by the EPA regarding solid waste.

Magistrate Judge's Report at 15.

The magistrate judge construed

Paragraph 4(c) as a promise by the buyer and its successors to
indemnify the seller and its successors against all environmental
liabilities associated with the Coke Plant.
In doing so, the magistrate judge decided that
Paragraph 4(c)'s textual reference to future "orders" issued by
state, local, and federal agencies contradicted the more
restrictive interpretation of Paragraph 4(c) which Beazer would
have us infer from the specific list of permits mentioned in
Exhibit F Paragraph 4(c).

If Paragraph 4(c) were confined to the

permits listed in Exhibit F, the magistrate judge reasoned that
Paragraph 4(c)'s reference to permits, licenses, and orders
"hereafter issued" would be meaningless.

Thus, he concluded that

Paragraph 4(c) did include all subsequent orders, permits, and
licenses relating to environmental liability including those

required or issued under CERCLA.

Accordingly, the magistrate

judge made the recommendation the district court accepted in
granting summary judgment to Mead and dismissing Beazer's claim
for contribution under CERCLA.
Paragraph 4(c) does expressly make Beazer responsible
for "solid waste . . . permits issued by [EPA]," but it has as
additional limiting language; "all in accordance with
applications now pending and listed on Exhibit F hereto."
Therefore, Beazer contends that the magistrate judge erred when
he concluded that Paragraph 4(c) clearly and unambiguously
transferred Mead's CERCLA liability to Beazer.

Beazer first

argues that Paragraph 4(c) is no more than a "window" provision,
common in commercial agreements for the sale of assets, which
gives a seller interim protection against a buyer's failure to
comply with the conditions of any existing environmental permits
that are specifically listed, as they are here in Exhibit F.
Thus, Beazer argues that the magistrate judge erred when he
failed to consider the parties' basic decision to structure the
sale as a purchase of assets.

Beazer would have us infer that

the decision to buy and sell assets was mutually agreed on for
the express purpose of limiting the purchaser's liability.

We

think Beazer's argument that purchasers under asset purchase
agreements normally assume only those debts, obligations, and
liabilities of the seller that are expressly identified in the
agreement is plausible and that the district court's holding that
Beazer must indemnify Mead would be inconsistent with that
purpose.

Nevertheless, we have been unable to find any evidence

in this record that would unambiguously confirm that
interpretation, and the text of Paragraph 4(c) is at least
arguably to the contrary.
1059-60 (Ala. 1990).

Cf. Watts v. TI, Inc., 561 So.2d 1057,

Therefore, we conclude that Beazer's

argument about the nature and purpose of framing a transfer of a
business enterprise as a sale of assets begs the question on
Paragraph 4(c)'s meaning.
Beazer's argument that the language of Paragraph 4(c)
is not clear enough to transfer Mead's CERCLA liability to Beazer
under Alabama law is more telling.

We conclude Paragraph 4(c) is

ambiguous under the principles of Alabama law that guides
determinations of contracts.

See Reeves Cedarhurst Dev. Corp. v.

First Amfed Corp., 507 So. 2d 184, 186 (Ala. 1992) ("An
instrument is unambiguous if only one reasonable meaning clearly
emerges.") (quoting Vainrib v. Downey, 565 So. 2d 647, 648 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1990).

The provision is subject to more than one

reasonable interpretation, and it is not plain enough to be
construed as an unambiguous promise by Beazer to indemnify Mead
against all environmental liability associated with the site of
the Coke Plant, including liability without fault under laws like
CERCLA, yet to be passed.

Therefore, it does not square with the

principle of Alabama law that promises to indemnify are limited
to subjects plainly expressed.
Moreover, cases outside Alabama which have held a
release or indemnification provision covers CERCLA liability have
all involved indemnity clauses with much broader and more
inclusive language than here.

See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp.,

14 F.3d at 326-27; Olin Corp., 5 F.3d at 12-13; Hardage, 985 F.2d
at 1434; Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 973 F.2d 1296, 1300 (6th Cir.
1992); Mardan Corp., 804 F.2d at 1461-62.
provides one recent example.8
8

.

The Olin Corp. case

The court of appeals held that

The sale agreement in Olin Corp. originally provided:
[The buyer] hereby assumes and agrees to be
responsible for and to pay, perform,
discharge and indemnify [the seller] against,
all liabilities (absolute or contingent),
obligations and indebtedness of [the seller]
related to the Aluminum Assets . . . as they
exist on the Effective Time or arise
thereafter with respect to actions or
failures to act occurring prior to the
Effective Time.

Olin Corp., 5 F.3d 12-13.
stated:

A later agreement in Olin Corp.

In consideration of the payment on this date
by [the seller] to [the buyer] of $3,700,000
. . . [the buyer] hereby releases and settles
all claims of any nature which [it] now has
or hereafter could have against [the seller]
. . . whether or not previously asserted,
under or arising out of the Purchase
Agreement . . ., or the transactions
contemplated thereby.
Id. at 13 (footnote omitted).
In the Kerr-McGee case the indemnification clause read:
[The purchaser] expressly agrees to indemnify
and to defend and hold [plaintiff's
predecessor Moss-American], its officers,
employees, and agents, free and harmless from
and against any and all claims, damages,
judgments, fines, penalties, assessments,
losses, expenses, including interest, court
costs and attorney fees, however the same may
be caused, arising out of or resulting from,
directly or indirectly, the following: (a)
the purchase, dismantling or sale of the

this provision evidenced a "clear and unmistakable intent" to
transfer the seller's environmental liability to the buyer, even
future and unknown liability.

Olin Corp., 5 F.3d at 15-16.

The court of appeals held:
In no uncertain terms, [the purchaser] agreed
to assume the liability for losses resulting
from "the maintenance of any . . . claim
. . . concerning pollution or nuisance
. . . ." The indemnity provision covers all
pollution and nuisance claims without
limitation . . . . [and makes the purchaser]
responsible for any liability imposed . . .
under CERCLA.

Id. at 327 (footnote omitted).
The contradictory terms and references of this
Agreement leave us with no firm conclusion as to the clear and
unmistakable intent of the parties.

Under applicable principles

of Alabama law, the parties failed to express the intent to
indemnify with the requisite clarity.

We hold, therefore, that

Paragraph 4(c) is not specific enough to impose on Beazer a duty
to indemnify Mead for their CERCLA response costs.
(..continued)
personal property and real property by [the
purchaser]; (b) the maintenance of any
action, claim or order concerning pollution
or nuisance; and (c) the use by [the
purchaser] or its employees or agents of the
personal property and real property.
Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 14 F.3d at 326-27 (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted). See also John S. Boyd Co., 992 F.2d at 40304 (construing a provision stating that "[the successor
corporation] agreed to assume 'all the duties and liabilities of
[its predecessor] related to [the] gas business'" and that "[the
successor corporation] agreed to 'indemnify and save harmless
[the predecessor corporation] from any duty or liability with
respect to the gas business.").

D.
Because Paragraphs 4(c) and 8 refer circuitously to
each other, it follows therefore that neither Paragraph 4(c) nor
Paragraph 8 expressly require either party to indemnify the
other.9

Accordingly, our earlier analysis requires us to reject

Beazer's argument that Paragraph 4(c) was intended to limit
Beazer's assumption of liabilities to those expressly listed in
Exhibit F, and that therefore because CERCLA is not a listed
obligation Mead must indemnify Beazer under Paragraph 8(a).
Beazer relies on the grammatical rule of the last antecedent to
assert that the language "all in accordance with . . . Exhibit F"
is a limitation on the preceding reference to "solid waste
disposal . . . order" in support of its argument that the
magistrate judge's construction of Paragraph 4(c)'s phrase "all
in accordance with" Exhibit F to mean "which includes" Exhibit F
must fail.

The phrase "all in accordance with" can be

interpreted as Beazer would have it, but it does not compel that
construction.

Beazer's contention that the magistrate judge

erred when he concluded the limitation of Paragraph 4(c) to the
permits expressly listed in Exhibit F would leave the words
9

. Mead's duty to indemnify Beazer is set forth in Paragraph
8(a) of the Agreement. It is quoted in full supra, Part I,
typescript at 6. It requires Mead, the seller, to indemnify
Beazer, the buyer, against all liabilities other than those
"expressly assumed by the Buyer." Paragraph 8(b), quoted supra
in note 7, is its mirror image. It requires Beazer, the buyer,
to indemnify Mead, the seller, against all liabilities "assumed
by Buyer."

"hereafter issued" without meaning does not persuade us.

As we

have already explained, its argument that these words merely
reflect an intent to protect the seller during a transition
period immediately following the transfer of assets to the buyer
fails to shine through the murky text of Paragraph 4(c).
Beazer's suggested interpretation of the words "hereafter issued"
as limited to permits or licenses that might result from the
pending applications is again plausible, but not so plain as to
justify its construction under the Alabama rule that indemnity
provisions must be strictly construed and limited to their plain
meaning.

E.
Paragraph 4(c) does not clearly state that Beazer has
agreed to assume all liability for toxic wastes under present or
future laws protecting the environment.

Though the phrase in

Paragraph 4(c), "hereafter issued," appears to look to the
future, the phrase "all in accordance with" appears to limit the
buyer's environmental liability to orders, permits and licenses
that are listed in the exhibit referenced.

Accordingly, nothing

in this agreement demonstrates a clear and unambiguous intent to
transfer all CERCLA liability to Beazer.
Our refusal to construe Paragraph 4(c) as a clear
promise by Beazer to indemnify Mead against CERCLA response costs
leaves both Beazer and Mead responsible for their fair share of
the cleanup costs associated with the Coke Plant.
reinforces CERCLA policy.

That result

"Congress enacted CERCLA, a complex

piece of legislation . . .

to force polluters to pay for costs

associated with remedying their pollution."

United States v.

Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992).

Thus, we

will reverse the district court's entry of summary judgment in
favor of Mead and remand this case for further proceedings on
Beazer's contribution claim.10

IV.

10

.

CONCLUSION

Section 9613(f) provides, in relevant part:
Any person may seek contribution from
any other person who is liable or potentially
liable under section 9607(a) of this title
. . . . In resolving contribution claims,
the court may allocate response costs among
liable parties using such equitable factors
as the court determines are appropriate.
*

*

*

A person who has resolved its liability
to the United States or a State for some or
all of a response action or for some or all
of the costs of such action in an
administrative or judicially approved
settlement may seek contribution from any
person who is not party to a settlement
. . . .
42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f)(1), (3)(B) (West Supp. 1994). The
magistrate judge determined that Mead was a "responsible party"
for purposes of CERCLA liability. It declined, however, to
apportion the response costs or reach Mead's or Beazer's
contribution claims under section 9613(f) because it found that
Beazer had agreed to indemnify Mead for all CERCLA liability
under Paragraph 4(c) of the Agreement. On remand, the trial
court will have to revisit the parties' contribution claims and
correspondingly apportion liability for the attendant CERCLA
response costs.

The order of the district court granting summary
judgment on Mead' counterclaim and the order dismissing Beazer's
claim for contribution will be reversed and the case will be
remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

